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Consider the following: A hiring manager is using a piece of software to review applicants 
for an open senior manager position at the company. They have entered the job description and 
qualifications into the software. The trainers of the software instructed the hiring manager to use 
the “best match” sort feature to have the best candidates appear first on the list. When 
implementing this software, the technology company used the hiring manger’s company’s past 
hiring decisions to help the software, using Artificial Intelligence (AI), predict who the best 
performers for a given job would be. The problem for any female or minority candidate is the AI 
evaluates them in terms of matching the firm’s history of hiring mostly white-male senior 
managers. In the end, the AI software presents the white-male candidates at the top of the “best 
match” list, while pushing the qualified female and minority candidates onto a second or third 
page.  
This issue is an example of AI algorithmic bias affecting employment and hiring decisions. 
Bias can affect the decisions of an AI through the human bias of its creators, either through biased 
training data or biased programming and model selection.1 This is not just a problem in hiring 
decision though as the impact of AI is felt in nearly all major sectors of the world economy, from 
healthcare and finance to real-estate and retail.2 To combat this problem, the executive branch has 
requested the vast network of Federal agencies to craft industry specific AI regulation while 
 
1 See Tivadar Danka, Five Real Dangers of AI, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Apr. 20, 2020) 
https://towardsdatascience.com/5-real-dangers-of-ai-1f94b4f0151d (describing algorithmic bias in hiring 
decisions when the AI learned from past human bias in hiring decisions). 




somehow not impairing the advancement of AI technology and research.3 As of April 2021, no 
federal agency has enacted any AI regulations.4 
The purpose of this paper is to first describe the history of AI, its successes, and its failures. 
The discussion will turn to the fundamentals of regulatory design, outside the lens of artificial 
intelligence. With that mutual understanding, the discussion will then turn to the executive 
branch’s outlined principal goals for future AI regulation and some environmental factors. Any 
new AI regulation will face a small mountain of challenges to surmount before the regulator can 
put it into action. Of worry, the size and scope of the AI industry is increasing faster by the day, 
and conventional enforcement measures seem ill equipped to take on this scale of a problem, 
especially with AI algorithms being so difficult to read or understand.5  
This paper argues that the only regulatory option that can handle all the executive branch’s 
requirements and be scalable and nimble enough to manage the ever-changing AI industry is a 
regulator-owned “Nanny” AI. This AI would enter firms’ systems to validate that both the training 
data of other AI and the reasoning that AI employs to reach its decisions does not violate any 
regulatory rules or show bias against certain demographics. This paper concludes by showing 




3 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial  
Intelligence Applications, M-21-06 (Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/M-21-06.pdf. 
4 Andrew Burt, New AI Regulations are Coming. Is Your Organization Ready, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 30, 
2021), https://hbr.org/2021/04/new-ai-regulations-are-coming-is-your-organization-ready.   
5 Artificial Intelligence Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report, 2021 – 2028, GRAND VIEW RESEARCH 
(Jan. 2021), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/artificial-intelligence-ai-market. 
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II. The Unregulated Approach to AI 
A. THE PROMISE OF AN AI FUTURE 
As of the end of 2020, the applications for AI in consumer products seems to be 
snowballing and analysts project the AI industry to continue to show over forty-percent compound 
growth per year for the next eight-years.6 Healthcare, pharmaceutical research, retail, marketing, 
finance, and intelligent process automation are some of the sectors that will see the fastest AI 
investment growth in the next five years.7 Tracing the long tail of AI development back in time, 
most agree that the 1950 Allen Turing paper, Computing Machine and Intelligence, sparked the 
artificial intelligence movement when it discussed how to build intelligent machines and how to 
test their intelligence.8 Turing suggested that if humans use available information and reason to 
solve problems and make decisions, why can’t machines do the same thing?9  
Five years after the release of this paper, the first AI program, Logic Theorist, was 
produced, and it was designed to prove mathematical theorems.10 After a famous 1956 conference 
initiated by John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky to showcase this program and the future of AI, 
the next twenty-years of AI development was catalyzed.11 Soon, researchers realized that 
 
6 Id. 
7 Takyar, supra note 2. 
8 Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. UNIV.: SCIENCE IN THE NEWS (Aug. 27, 
2017), https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/; see Rebecca Reynoso, A 
Complete History of Artificial Intelligence (May 25, 2021), https://www.g2.com/articles/history-of-artificial-
intelligence.  
9 Anyoha, supra note 8. 
10 Logic Theorist – Complete History of the Logic Theorist Program, History Computer, https://history-
computer.com/inventions/logic-theorist-complete-history-of-the-logic-theorist-program/ (last visited Jun. 
12, 2021).  
11 Anyoha, supra note 8. 
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additional AI developments were futile because of the lack of computer horsepower, and the 
problem was only solved in the late 1990’s.12  
Coming back to the current day, computer resources are now sufficient to accomplish most, 
if not all, research goals.13 Most of the recent AI programs put out into the world have developed 
more from an ocean of data rather than elaborate algorithm enhancements, so paths for 
advancement are still open.14 The following are four of the most recognizable accomplishments: 
1) self-driving cars; 2) autonomous investing; 3) automated pharmaceutical development; and 4) 
automated HR decisions.15 
B. THE FAILURES OF UNREGULATED AI 
“Until people see robots going down the street killing people, they don’t know how to react 
because it seems so ethereal.”16 The fact that the birth and life of AI remains hidden within 
computers makes it impossible for the public to identify when an AI is harming them, whether due 
to failures in design or poor monitoring while the AI learns behavior.17 Some issues with AI do in 
fact rear there head for the public to see, such as when an autonomous vehicle gets into an accident 





15 Takyar, supra note 2. 
16 Elon Musk, CEO, Tesla, Ahead of the Curve, Address at the 2017 National Governors Association Summer 
Meeting (Jul. 17, 2017) (stating AI is a fundamental risk to the existence of human civilization). 
17 Unregulated use of AI is Threat to Sustainable Development, OPEN ACCESS GOVERNMENT (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/sustainable-development/93559/ (recalling fiasco when algorithms 
were asked to make nuanced decisions about academic achievement, based on elements that would never be 
considered in an exam). 
18 Neal E. Boudette, Crashes Involving Tesla Autopilot and other Driver-Assistance Systems get new 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/29/business/tesla-autopilot-




A more worrisome danger relates to the potential bias that could be ingrained in an AI from 
either bias present in training data, institutional bias, or developer bias.19 With AI now capable of 
creating realistic fake images, the AIs threaten news feeds with misinformation in a tactic known 
as deep fake; swaying target audiences towards certain thoughts.20 With automated investing 
promising better returns by competing on an even playfield with the algorithms of the largest firms, 
investors face the possibility of an AI harming them financially by choosing a conflicting 
investor’s interests over their own.21 The ultimate goal of new AI regulations should be to target 
and limit the impact of AI decisions based on existing biases or bad intentions. 
C. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING AI 
Before a regulator can start designing effective regulation for the AI industry, it must avoid 
and surmount the plethora of challenges specific to this industry. The first feature of the AI industry 
that makes it one of the most difficult to regulate is it’s an industry in only the loosest sense of the 
word; the use of computers to make decisions ranges from automation technology to 
conversational and recognition systems.22 When firms create AI designed for different tasks and 
impacts, the threats they pose vary by application and the regulatory system must increase in 
complexity to match.23 Aside from the issue of breadth, the depth of the industry, in terms of the 
 
19 See Danka, supra note 1 (describing algorithmic bias in hiring decisions when the AI learned from past 
human bias in hiring decisions). 
20 Id. 
21 Cf. E. Scott Brummel, Confronting Natural Conflicts of Interest and Artificial Intelligence, Journal of Law 
and the Biosciences, Volume 4, Issue 2, August 2017, Pages 435–444, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsx029 
(highlighting the risk of AI avoiding a doctor’s COI and replacing it with an invisible COI created from 
biased protocols and recommendations). 





sheer quantity of AI systems and their rapid growth rate, pose a significant resource challenge for 
the future regulator to first discover all of the AI systems and then monitor as many as they can.24  
There exists a mainstream bias against regulation as always being inefficient and, if applied 
to AI, regulation would run against the strategic goal for continued rapid development.25 Arguably, 
the most talked about challenges of regulating AI are the transparency and explainability of AI.26 
Transparency refers to the black-box nature of many public and some private organizations which 
inhibits outsiders, including regulators, from observing operations.27 Explainability is the concept 
of designing AI from the outset to that individuals other than the developer can understand how 
and why the AI is reaching its decisions.28 The reason explainability is a challenge is that the best 
and most efficient AIs are “deep learning” and by nature hard to explain, even for the creating 
developer.29  
III. Review: An Abundance of Regulatory Design Options 
The Federal legislative process has failed to enact meaningful AI-focused statutes that 
would protect individual’s privacy and curtail the discriminatory impact AIs have already 
demonstrated. In 2019, congress introduced two draft bills, one in the house, the other in the 
senate.30 US Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) along with Rep. Yvette D. 
Clarke (D-NY) introduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act in April 2019 in the house of 
 
24 Id.; Artificial Intelligence Market Size, supra note 5. 
25 Jia Kai, AI Regulation: Understanding the Real Challenges, Paris Innovation Review (May 25, 2017), 
http://parisinnovationreview.com/articles-en/ai-regulation-understanding-the-real-challenges.  
26 Charles Morgan, Responsible AI: A Global Policy Framework, ITechLaw 1, 113-14 (2018) (explaining 
the obligation of transparency and explainability). 
27 Id.; see Schmelzer, supra note 22. 
28 Morgan, supra note 26. 
29 Id. 
30 Cynthia Brumfield, New AI Privacy, Security Regulations likely coming with Pending Federal, State Bills, 




representatives. That bill required companies to find and fix flawed algorithms that result in 
inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting Americans.31 It also required 
entities to conduct automated decision system impact assessments and data protection impact 
assessments.32  
The Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act was the other aforementioned AI related 
bill introduced in 2019.33 That bill, introduced to the Senate, prohibited entities from “collecting, 
processing, storing, or controlling facial recognition data unless such entities (1) provide 
documentation that explains the capabilities and limitations of facial-recognition technology, and 
(2) obtain explicit affirmative consent from end-users to use such technology after providing notice 
about the reasonably foreseeable uses of the collected facial-recognition data.”34 The bill was 
concerned with facial-recognition data that enables an AI to uniquely and consistently identify a 
specific individual.35 While, if enacted into law, these bills resemble positive steps forward on the 
path to protecting individuals from bad behaving Ais, the Federal legislative process has thus far 
failed because both bills have died in their respective committees.36 
Seeing the present and potential future issues with an unregulated AI industry, the 
executive branch made it clear their desire to reign in the risks associated with rapid AI 
development. On February 11th, 2019, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order 







36 See H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019), S. 847, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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outline how the numerous Federal Agencies should begin regulating AI.37 The OMB responded to 
this order by, on November 17th, 2020, issuing a memorandum that outlines the principles for 
future regulation while keeping the executive branch’s concern of not slowing down the 
development of AI at the forefront.38  
In this memorandum, the OMB outlined the following ten principles all Federal Agencies 
should follow when formulating regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to the design, 
development, deployment, and operation of AI applications: 1) Public Trust of AI; 2) Public 
Participation; 3) Scientific Integrity and Information Quality; 4) Risk Assessment and 
Management; 5) Benefits and Costs; 6) Flexibility; 7) Fairness and Non-Discrimination; 8) 
Disclosure and Transparency; 9) Safety and Security; and 10) Interagency Coordination.39 If 
regulations would be too burdensome for either the agency or the regulated entities, the agency 
should allow the industries to establish voluntary consensus standards.40 The primary benefit of 
voluntary consensus standards is that they allow the requisite adaptability to keep pace with the 
rapid AI development curve.41 
With this memorandum from the OMB, the executive branch has identified its principal 
goals for the future of AI and mandated that all Federal agencies develop new regulatory 
machinations to minimize the risks facing the public while still promoting rapid growth in the 
field. The Federal Register lists that there are currently 241 Federal agencies and another 215 sub-
 
37 Exec. Order No. 13859, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 
(Feb. 11, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-
american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/. 






agencies.42 Absent extensive cross-agency cooperation, all these 456 Federal bodies will have to 
individually consider how to both design and enforce AI regulations. This process of regulation is 
still in the infancy stage as initial plans of regulation, a two-page form, was due from each agency 
to the OMB by May 17, 2021.43  
Since the release of the OMB’s memorandum, a new presidential administration has started 
under the leadership of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.44 Whether this new administration continues 
the previous administration’s agency, and often industry, specific regulation strategy or works with 
Congress to create a new agency aimed at regulating AI across all industries is unknown. 
Regardless of the top-level structure, these new regulations will need to follow tried and true 
regulatory design methodology, namely regulatory form, function, and scope, and apply them to 
this burgeoning industry. 
A. REGULATORY FORMS – MEANS V. ENDS, MICRO V. MACRO 
While not the only way of conceptualizing regulatory design, breaking it into the two 
attributes, means versus ends and micro versus macro, harmonizes the linguistics and follows 
scholarly literature on regulation.45 “Means-based” regulation focuses on actions, such as the use 
of a technology or practice.46 For example, regulators may require firms to install a particular type 
of valve, retain certain documents, conduct certain observations or measurements, or inspect the 
condition of equipment at specified intervals.47 Alternatively, an “Ends-based” regulation can 
 
42 Agencies, Federal Register (Apr. 16, 2021), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies. 
43 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 3. 
44 Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The White House (Jan. 20, 2021) available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-
joseph-r-biden-jr/. 
45 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, Designing Safety Regulations for High 





mandate the achievement or avoidance of certain ends. “Ends-based” regulation may require that 
a code-compliant building be capable of evacuating all occupants in a designated time, that a 
factory keep its emission of air pollutants below certain levels, or that an employer keep the 
workplace free of all identifiable hazards. 
“Micro-level” regulations target a specific contributor or underlying pathway to the 
ultimate problem.48 “Macro-level” regulations, on the other hand, broaden their focus to the 
ultimate problem itself.49 Regulators choose micro-level far more often than macro-level because 
they are more precise, and regulators can bundled them together to tackle complex problems or 
situations.50 As an example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
issues hundreds of micro-level safety standards such as automobile exterior lighting, braking, and 
occupant protection.51 The NHTSA chose this micro-level approach because of the layered web of 
factors that lead to the ultimate problem; traffic fatalities and injuries.52 However, for the ultimate 
problem of motor vehicle fuel economy, the NHTSA has chosen macro-level regulations requiring 
an average fleetwide fuel level for each automaker.53 The NHTSA decided the micromanagement 
of the factors leading to fuel efficiency was not necessary, and the automakers appreciate the 
flexibility this macro-level regulation provides them.54 
Following the definitions of these two attributes of regulatory design, one can describe 











means; and 4) Macro-ends. It is with these categories that the future AI regulators should refine 
their approach while keeping in mind the goals outlined by the executive branch’s OMB.  
 
TABLE 1 Four Types of Regulations with Examples 
 Means End 
Micro Micro-Means 
 Install a hazard warning sign 
having a certain color scheme 
 Install a particular type of valve 
 Inspect the condition of 
equipment at a defined time 
interval 
 Construct a pipeline by using a 
specified grade of steel 
 
Micro-Ends 
 Ensure that an electrical 
component of a product passes a 
test for shock resistance 
 Limit sulfur dioxide emissions to 
certain levels 
 Demonstrate the capability to 
evacuate all occupants from a 
building in a designated time 
Macro Macro-Means 
 Engage in threat and risk analysis 
 Establish and execute a safety 
management program 
 Reevaluate and revise safety 
management plan at regular 
intervals 
Macro-Ends 
 Keep the workplace free from 
recognized hazards 
 Design and maintain a facility to 
prevent releases of hazardous 
substances 







 Means Ends 
Micro Micro-Means   
Macro     
 
First, micro-means (prescriptive) regulations offer clear instructions about actions that 
regulated entities must take, and they also allow the regulator or other approved third party to 
easily monitor these actions.56 The disadvantages of micro-means regulations are that it is furthest 
away from the Government’s ultimate concerns, and it is inflexible and not best suited for rapidly 
changing regulatory environments.57  
 Means Ends 
Micro   Micro-Ends 
Macro     
 
Second, micro-ends (performance-based) regulations require regulated entities to meet 
some measurable goal or not exceed some listed limit, such as and EPA limit on air pollutants or 
the earlier mentioned fuel efficiency regulation of the NHTSA.58 Compared to micro-means, this 
 
56 See Id.; Wendell Pritchett, Types of Regulation, The Regulatory Review (Apr. 5, 2016), available at 
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/05/pritchett-types-of-regulation/. 




form of regulatory design has greater flexibility for regulated entities to remain in compliance and 
the regulations are more directly linked to the ultimate concern of the Government.59 Advocates 
of this regulatory design category argue that it promotes innovation and reduces costs by 
encouraging the regulated entity to figure out the best way to achieve societal goals.60 The primary 
issue with micro-ends regulation is that measurement of the required ends can be difficult and 
prohibitively costly for both the regulated entities and regulators.61 This difficulty in monitoring 
can lead to bad actors gaming the system, such as the Volkswagen scandal when the company 
rigged its emission system to skirt regulatory limits.62 
 Means Ends 
Micro     
Macro Macro-Means   
 
The third regulatory design category is macro-means (management-based) regulations 
which infuse a greater level of responsibility and accountability into the regulated entities.63 A 
typical regulation of this category requires a regulated entity to develop risk management plan, but 
the regulation does not usually specify exactly what such a plan must contain.64 While, compared 
to micro-means, these plans offer greater flexibility, there is risk here that, if the regulator lacks 
 
59 Id. 
60 Pritchett, supra note 56. 
61 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45. 
62 Pritchett, supra note 56. 




the expertise to effectively review these management plans and their execution, bad acting firms 
may slip through the regulatory gaps.65 To mitigate this issue, regulators impose a collection of 
macro-level regulations that can work in unison to ensure overall firm compliance.66 There are 
risks with this approach though, as, one, too many regulations on an industry can prove overly 
costly to both the firms and public resources, and, two, the more regulations, the less likely they 
all are complementary to each other.67 
Another issue with macro-means regulations is that if the regulated industry consists of 
firms of varying sizes, the smaller firms may not be able to bear the burden of establishing and 
executing complex risk management plans, thus stifling growth.68 In limited circumstances, 
agencies have chosen to use a management-based regulator technique known as “potential 
regulation” which place no initial restrictions on a firm’s activities, but, if the firm’s performance 
is judged to be unsatisfactory according to the regulator, such as customer complaints, restrictions 
will them be installed.69 In the case of “potential regulation”, the monitors of the firm’s activities 





66 Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation, OECD, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/environment/outreach/33947759.pdf. 
67 Id. 
68 See Id.; Pritchett, supra note 56. 




 Means Ends 
Micro     
Macro   Macro-Ends 
 
The fourth, and final, regulatory design category, macro-ends, is also the least category of 
consequence with regards to regulating the AI industry. This category limits regulated entities via 
tort liability or “general duty” provisions.71 While these liabilities are closely tied to the ultimate 
concern, the public can be concerned with the ex-post liability not being effective at incentivizing 
firms to meet the ends.72 Firms may find that the cost of insurance or benefits of misconduct are 
more attractive than limiting their exposure to tort liability.73 In certain, appropriate, industries, a 
form of macro-ends design, known as “incentive regulation”, grants the firm freedom of decision 
and the Government rewards firms based on how they perform according with set goals or 
benchmarks.74 For the telecom industry, the Government sets a price cap which details what the 
average price of services should be, but the firm has complete control over how they price their 
services and the government rewards them if they come in below the target.75 
Outside of these four categories of regulatory design, regulators still have more options to 
choose from, usually doing so in more nuanced situations. In the case of the FDA, the regulator 
allows pharmaceutical development to begin free of restrictions, but unless the FDA approves of 
 
71 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 




the drug, drug companies cannot sell it to the public.76 This form of regulation is known as 
“reactive” policy.77 Proactive policies, in contrast, place restrictions on firms from the outset, such 
as the FDA barring research into human cloning.78 Sound regulatory design, especially with 
regards to AI regulation, requires regulators to implement a collection of restrictions; micro-level 
when Federal expertise and budget allows; macro-level when flexibility is key and the regulated 
firms have exhibited good behavior. 
B. REGULATORY FUNCTION: INFORMING V. ENFORCING 
Function is a second dimension by which regulation policies can differ from one another. 
Regulators, seeking to protect the public from commercial wrongdoing, must deploy the protective 
regulations through either informing or enforcing functioning regulations.79 A primary example of 
informing regulation is the requirement that food manufacturers list all the 
ingredients contained in their products.80 In comparison, enforcing regulation in the food industry 
could prohibit the use of certain chemicals in foods.81 A second example of 
the difference between informing and enforcing regulations can be taken from the textile 
manufacturing industry. Informing regulation might require each manufacturer of machinery to 
cover the dangerous parts of a machine with visible warning stickers to warn end-users of said 








82 International Organization for Standardization (ISO), (2016). Textile machinery — Safety requirements 
(ISO Standard No. 11111-1), available at https://www.iso.org/standard/65561.html. 
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wide safety standards, requiring all manufacturers to surround the machines in transparent doors 
which are impossible to open while the machine is in operation.83 
The key distinction between informing and enforcing regulation is the discretion afforded 
the protected population.84 Informing regulation enables the population to make well-informed 
choices; enforcing regulation makes choices for the population.85 The choice of regulatory function 
is tied to both the ultimate goal of the regulation and the relative costs of acquiring and processing 
information for the regulator and for the protected population.86 If the regulator shows weakness 
when enforcing existing regulations, they may be limited to employing only informing regulation 
since firms will be unlikely to take the regulator’s threats or promises seriously.87 In such a 
scenario, a bad acting and regulated firm can only be disciplined by informed consumers (and 
possibly competitors).88 AI regulations are capable of functioning by informing and enforcing 
regulations, but the regulator must be committed to disciplining those firms that violate enforcing 
regulations so that the regulated industry does not lose faith in the regulator.89 However, AI 
informing regulations are unlikely to be effective unless the regulator presents the information to 
consumers as close to the interaction with the AI as possible so that the consumer does not lose 
the information in a sea of distracting information online. On the other hand, analysts project the 
scale of the AI industry to grow annually by over forty percent which will make the regulator’s 
task of enforcing regulations time intensive and exhausting.90 
 
83 Id. 






90 Artificial Intelligence Market Size, supra note 5. 
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C. SCOPE OF REGULATION 
The third and final dimension of regulations is the scope or breadth of the regulation, and 
the comprehensiveness of a given regulation is nearly always controlled by the type of industry it 
targets.91 In some industries, like telecommunications, comprehensive regulation is common.92 
The regulator generally controls the prices charged by the telecommunications provider, limits the 
firm's earnings, monitors the quality of the firm’s products, oversees the firm's major investments, 
and dictates the markets in which the firm is allowed to operate.93 In other industries, like 
pharmaceuticals, regulation is often more partial. The FDA regulates the safety of drugs, but they 
neither regulate drug prices nor the earnings of pharmaceutical companies.94 Another factor on the 
scope of regulation is the number of suppliers of a similar product that have varying firm sizes.95 
The larger firms draw more regulator attention and become subject to a suite of enforcing 
regulations whereas the regulator may completely ignore a smaller firm.96 To correlate this with 
the AI industry, the tech giants (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, etc.) will likely draw intense 
attention from the regulator, while the rest of the commercial market that creates and employs AI 
is likely to be subject to a more manageable set of enforcement regulations. 
The three dimensions of regulatory design—form, function, and scope—are interwoven 
and similarly impacted by five key factors of the regulatory environment: 1) regulator goals; 2) 
regulator resources; 3) regulator reputation and commitment to enforcement; 4) the nature of the 
 








regulated product and its customers; and 5) scale, complexity, and access to information.97 A 
regulator would be wise to study these environmental factors towards the beginning of the 
regulatory design process so that the proposed regulation is more likely to fit its target industry. 
With that step complete, the regulator can move the levers of the regulatory design machine to find 
the appropriate balance point for each of the three design dimensions and proceed towards 
enactment. 
IV. Draft Regulatory Framework for the AI Industry; Employ “Nanny” AI to Inspect 
Regulated AI 
A. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING AI 
i. THE VARIED APPLICATIONS OF AI REQUIRE A COMPLEX REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Varied industries find use of AI in their businesses by seeing AI’s potential to solve 
problems unique to their sector, ranging from automated decision-making based on “big data”, to 
autonomous fleets of vehicles, and to reducing expensive employee headcount.98 The Federal 
government issued a memo outlining their plan to tackle this scope issue; the regulations should 
be agency and industry specific.99 In that same memo, the government admitted the lack of AI 
expertise within the government and instructed the agencies to seek guidance in crafting the 
regulations from the regulated industries themselves.100 However, political capture is a significant 
issue in situations with such a divide in expertise between the government and the regulated, or 
 
97 Id. 
98 See Schmelzer, supra note 22.  




when some firms have outlandish lobbying budgets.101 In the financial crisis of 2007, the financial 
industry used political capture to weaken enforcement results and fines, and the public saw firms 
getting off easy for their wrongdoings.102 The fact remains that the government lacks the expertise 
to design regulations for AI while being insulated from industry influence.103 Therefore, the early 
stages of AI regulation must be guided by the industry.104  
To mitigate future risks of political capture, the regulator should consider the OECD’s four 
strategies: 1) using decision-making processes that promote inclusiveness and social 
accountability; 2) fostering transparency and access to information; 3) enabling the external 
accountability of decision-makers through supreme audit institutions and regulatory enforcement 
agencies; and 4) addressing capture risks through integrity measures at the organizational level.105 
Taking this advice, the AI regulator should engage a multitude of viewpoints from industry, make 
the project open to outside observers, and have a cooperation agreement established that sets out 
audit and integrity standards. The government should also be aggressive at hiring away industry 
professionals and recent graduates without deep ties to industry to reduce the expertise gap. 
  
 
101 Shanta Devarajan, Three Reasons why Industrial Policy Fails, BROOKINGS (Jan. 14, 2016), 
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ii. THE GROWTH OF THE AI INDUSTRY REQUIRES LARGE AND FLEXIBLE REGULATOR 
RESOURCES 
Because analysts anticipate the AI industry to have accelerating growth over the next eight 
years, the regulator must devise a regulatory framework that meets the primary goals of the 
government while also being scalable.106 If the regulator chose micro-means regulations, such 
inspecting training datasets to ensure compliance with bias standards, that would put a lot of strain 
on regulator resources to conduct meaningful inspections and would be difficult to scale up as the 
industry grows.107 These regulations are also the least flexible and would make application to a 
variety of industry application of AI troublesome.108  
Micro-ends regulation, such as limiting the types of decisions and applications AI can be 
used for, offers the flexibility needed, but sacrifices the ability for non-experts to measure 
compliance easily.109 The black-box nature of some AI also mutes the impact of these regulations 
since all but the last output of the system are hidden and a firm could use that feature to hide bad 
acts.110 Without in-house expertise, macro-means regulations, such as requirements for risk 
management plan submission to the regulator, seems non-workable because the plans would be 
too complicated for a non-expert to conduct a meaningful review and audit.111 These plans would 
also hurt the growth of smaller AI development firms due to their high cost of implementation 
with no return of revenue.112  
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With no clear best option, a mixture of these types of regulations is the approach a regulator 
should take for AI, but micro-means inspections are the only way to protect against algorithmic 
bias and AI designed for harmful purposes, each principal goals for the government.113 In order to 
mitigate the intense resource issue with micro-means regulations, the regulator should consider 
using AI technology to automate the inspection process of external AIs. From here on, this 
discussion will refer to this regulator AI as the “Nanny” AI. 
iii. THE REGULATOR MUST SHOW THE REGULATIONS WILL NOT STIFLE AI DEVELOPMENT 
The proposed “Nanny” AI must demonstrate to Congress and the regulatory community 
that it is not another inefficient regulation that would slow the growth of the AI industry.114 The 
OMB draft rules required any agency rule to show that the intended benefits of the AI regulation 
outweigh the costs, particularly on the industry.115 A common inefficiency of regulation presents 
itself when poorly written rules incentivize firms to make undesirable choices, such as when 
Japanese car manufacturers designed cars to be heavier than needed to become subject to less strict 
efficiency standards.116 Another example is the risk management plan development costs discussed 
for macro-means regulations.117 The largest efficiency concern the government expressed for AI 
regulation is that AI development should not be slowed or hindered by any new regulation, industry 
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growth is paramount.118 The AI regulator must show how the “Nanny” AI supports the principal 
goals of the government, detail how it will interface and interact with private and public firms, and 
ensure that it will have minimal negative impact on the AI developers’ research or the firms’ 
profits. 
iv. THE REGULATIONS MUST ENCOURAGE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FIRM TRANSPARENCY AND 
AI EXPLAINABILITY 
Congress must give the AI regulator enough congressional authority that its enforcement 
capabilities are able to control previously inaccessible, black-box firms, regardless of their public 
or private status. This level of transparency equates to access to firm data and communications 
with AI developers to understand their intentions for the firm’s AI(s).119 Firms will push back on 
this level of access, claiming that the AI algorithms and related training data are trade secrets.120 
The firms will also complain that compelling a business or agency to publicize decision-making 
rules, such as a method for determining when an individual should be audited, may allow potential 
auditees to game the system.121 To assuage the firms’ fears, the regulator could create rules that 
define what can and cannot be disclosed from firm data and technology. The regulator should be 
most interested in issuing cease and desist orders to a firm if an AI is causing harm and publishing 
notices of violation when the regulator discovers bias in an AI’s training data, or the AI is making 
biased decisions. The regulator’s goal is not to disclose firm IP. 
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The goal of AI explainability is to take an AI model’s outputs and be able to accurately 
describe how it got to those outputs.122 Explainability is an important concern for regulators 
because as AIs continue to get more advanced, they will increasingly become opaquer, particularly 
in data-driven technologies like machine learning where the relation between input  
and output is harder to explain.123 The risk of hidden features and decisions within an black-box 
AI is just the fear that ignited the executive branch’s request for regulation.124 Explainability 
receives significant criticism from industry, however, as they argue that the most powerful AI 
models are those that are hardest to explain; the chief advantage of AI is it can solve problems that 
humans never could.125 The goal for the “Nanny” AI would be to allow firms to develop the AI 
models as sophisticated as they want so long as, with sufficient access to data, the regulator’s AI 
will be able to describe how the firm’s AI came to its decisions. 
B. ENSURING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OVER THE “NANNY” AI 
There is no guarantee that the “Nanny” AI, government funded and built, will be any better 
at avoiding bias or making the right decisions for enforcement actions one-hundred out of one-
hundred times. If the regulator’s AI shows it to be faulty or inaccurate, the regulator’s enforcement 
powers will weaken considerably.126 One benefit of a new regulator relying on industry to help 
craft rules, and potentially a regulatory AI, is that it democratizes the process and lets the sun shine 
light on the decisions made.127 However, in a recent executive order made by the then outgoing 
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President Trump, the President proclaimed that any significant agency rule approved by anyone 
other than a politically appointed staff member should be assumed to be lacking democratic 
accountability.128  
Like the regulated firm’s concern that if their AI is too transparent it would allow outsiders 
to game the system, the regulator would be concerned that if the “Nanny” AI’s methodology was 
widely known, regulated entities could tailor their AI to hide from the regulator.129 Therefore, the 
regulator would desire to keep secret certain aspects of the “Nanny” AI, thus diminishing 
democratic accountability to an extent.130 To improve this situation, the regulator should make 
routine stress testing results of the AI public, showing that the AI correctly flagged or didn’t flag 
suspect AIs and training data for enforcement actions. Since all Federal agencies originate from 
some Congressional authorization, Congress has the power to have an oversight committee 
perform random inspections of the “Nanny” AI’s results.131 The last major role for this outside 
oversight committee would be to vet the backgrounds of any developer creating or modifying the 
regulator’s AI with their goal being to prevent a developer’s bias from infecting the training data 
or making the system more inaccurate.132 By using private industry to help craft the rules and AI, 
being as transparent as possible with inspection and testing results, and being subject to 
congressional oversight, the AI regulator is sufficiently ensuring democratic accountability over 
their enforcement powers. 
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The wild west that is AI development has sufficiently shown itself to cause direct harm to 
individuals, especially from bias inherited from the AI developers, training data, and historic bias. 
The executive branch has already identified ten principals for future regulation of AI, notably 
public trust, and transparency, but we are still waiting for either the legislative branch to pass laws 
or Federal agencies to even propose rules for regulating the industry.133 
To effectively control the AI industry without imposing burdens on the industries growth 
rate, the regulator must navigate the following four challenges: 1) the variety of AI applications 
forcing regulatory complexity; 2) the size and growth of the industry requiring large and flexible 
regulatory resources; 3) the regulations not stifling industry growth; a demand of the executive 
branch; and 4) the regulations coercing private and public firms to be more transparent and 
incentivizing their AIs to be explainable.134 For the regulator to both meet the executive branch’s 
goals for regulation and overcome the four critical challenges, the regulator must employ micro-
means inspection regulations and utilize AI technology to make the magnitude of the regulatory 
task feasible. 
For the public to trust the regulator’s “Nanny” AI and the regulator’s related enforcement 
actions to be effective, the AI system must demonstrate its accuracy, and, for the latter, the 
regulator must be committed to even-handed enforcement.135 As the industry evolves, so too will 
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the “Nanny” AI, and it will be imperative for an oversight committee to routinely review the AI’s 
performance results so that democratic accountability is protected.136 
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